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This paper analyses the political constraints of intergenerational risk sharing. The
rst result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex ante optimal
insurance. The second result is that in a second best political setting PAYG still
contributes to intergenerational risk sharing. The third result is that aging in-
creases the discrepancy between rst-best and second-best transfers. The source of
the ine¢ ciency is that politicians redistribute to larger and easier swayed cohorts.
Ex post redistribution to lower incomes still leads to an outcome that from an ex
ante point of view is preferable to a situation without intergenerational transfers.
JEL code: D72, E61, H21, H55.
Key words: risk sharing, aging, political economy
1 Introduction
By their nature macro-economic risks cannot be avoided, but their e¤ect can be
mitigated by sharing them between generations. The optimal design of intergen-
erational risk sharing has been investigated by many authors, including Gordon
and Varian [1988], Beetsma and Bovenberg [2007] and Gollier [2008]. While this
1Tilburg University, department of general economics (d.a.hollanders@uvt.nl). The author
thanks Lex Meijdam, as well as participants of Netspar lunchseminar (September 2008), the Nake
Day (October 2008), and two Netspar macro-pillar theme meetings (September 2008, February
2009) for helpful comments.
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literature focuses on the optimal design, this paper focuses on the political limits
of optimal risk sharing instead.
Intergenerational risk sharing necessitates that future generations participate,
but unborn generations are not able to agree on such participation. Once the
young enter the insurance market, the outcome for the elderly is known and is
thus uninsurable. Markets can therefore not implement optimal intergenerational
risk sharing. The government can enforce participation and is thereby in the
position to ensure the ex ante e¢ cient transfer scheme.
This papers central observation is that political decisions are not driven by ef-
ciency. Political decisions depend on political support of voters. Political parties
are not concerned with insurance but with redistributing towards large and/or
easy swayed voters. The institution that is in a position to implement insurance
is thus motivated by redistribution instead.
The central question is whether ex ante e¢ cient risk sharing still arises endo-
genously in a democratic society that is primarily concerned with redistribution.
This question is analyzed with a probabilistic voting model where the government
gives priority to larger and easier swayed cohorts. The resulting answer is that
politically determined allocations generally di¤er from the optimal allocations.
From an ex ante perspective they are nonetheless better than "autarky" with
each generation saving for itself. In a democratic political process, some risk shar-
ing still arises. The reason is that low returns on savings for the elderly induces
politicians to redistribute from young to older generations. The lower incomes of
the latter makes their political support more sensitive to the tax policy, as political
support depends linearly on utility and marginal utility is decreasing.
This paper build on the literature on the political economy of Social Security,
see Galasso and Profeta [2002] for an overview. This literature focuses mainly
on xed transfers in a non-stochastic environment. Rangel and Zeckhauser [1999]
and Demange [2005] are exceptions who consider a stochastic environment using a
median voter model. The median voter model has the limitation that the majority
generation holds all political power. This generally leads to a wide range of ration-
alizable equilibria when the median voter is young and the prediction of maximum
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taxation when the median voter is old. Following DAmato and Galasso [2008] this
paper proposes that a probabilistic voting model is better suited to analyze the
political limits of risk sharing and the e¤ect of aging upon that. In this approach
a minority is no longer politically powerless and taxation is an important factor
for voters but not necessarily the only one.
The main di¤erence between this paper and DAmato and Galasso is the dif-
fering question. The question here is to what extend a political process skewed
towards redistribution still generates ex ante insurance. Therefore the welfare
concept is ex ante e¢ ciency and the e¢ cient allocations are compared to the
political process. Any deviation between the two may be considered the (unavoid-
able) costs of institutions. This deviation arises from the political clout of large
cohorts.
DAmato and Galasso instead compare maximization of a Social Welfare
Function with the decisions of their government. Their normative benchmark
then includes redistribution towards the rst generation. Their government is
a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis future governments, not only anticipating future
governments will "bail-out" the currently young generations out but actively ex-
ploiting it. Their question is therefore to what extent "exploiting" behavior of
current governments -and not the political inuence of large groups- aggravates
redistribution -and not how it a¤ects risk sharing per se.
The di¤erent approaches further determine the e¤ect of aging on Social Se-
curity. DAmato and Galasso predict that aging decreases contributions on Social
Security, as a lower rate of return of PAYG decreases the scope to exploit future
generations. This paper argues that the political clout of the elderly dwarfs all
other e¤ects and aging increases the discrepancy between the optimal transfer and
the political feasible one.
This paper abstracts from incentive e¤ects and general equilibrium e¤ects,
see Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martin [2006] and Kruger and Kubler [2006] for
important contributions. Here not the exact degree of risk sharing is the issue but
whether politics allows whatever is e¢ cient to be executed.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces
the overlapping generation model with probabilistic voting and discusses the di¤er-
ent agents in the model. The third section determines and discusses the rst-best
and second-best results in two di¤erent settings; rst when savings are xed and
second when savings are endogenous. The last section concludes.
2. The model
In the next section two separate cases are considered; the case when savings are
xed and exogenous and the case when savings are endogenous. This section
discusses the latter, more general setting.
The model consists of overlapping generations that live two periods. Wages
and capital returns are determined on international markets and are exogenous
from the perspective of the small, open economy considered here. People work in
the rst period and are retired in the second period. In the rst period people
inelastically supply one unit of labor, for which they receive a wage w that is
normalized to one. Government can set a lump-sum tax  distributing the pro-
ceedings to the retired generation. The after-tax wage can be either consumed or
saved. Retirees consume accrued savings and any tax-nanced benets.
There are two states of the economy, one state (state L) in which gross capital
return is low, and another state (state H) in which it is high. Capital return is
Bernouilli distributed with rL < 1 < rH , where the superscript indicates the state
of the economy. State L occurs with probability 0 5  5 1, and state H occurs
with complementary probability 1   . There is constant geometric population
growth n: Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1, where Nt is the number of young agents in period t
and n >  1. The agents in the model are now discussed in turn.
2.1 Individuals
Agents born at time t have a time-separable utility function with felicity functions
exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
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Here cyt and c
o
t represent consumption in the rst and second period respectively
of an agent born at time t. There is no time preference in this model. This could
easily be included, but that would not add to the conclusion nor change it.
The young maximize expected life-time utility with respect to savings, taking
taxes in the current period as given. For young agents, this boils down to max-
imizing u(cyt ) + Eu(c
o
t ) subject to w = c
y
t +  t + st and given expectations on the
tax rate in the next period (addressed below). The constraint follows from the
life-time budget of the individual. Consumption in old age depends on the state
of the economy and expected second period consumption is given by:
E(cot ) = [str
L + (1 + n)bLt+1] + (1  )[strH + (1 + n)bHt+1]
The probability distribution of capital market returns is common knowledge; the
distribution of taxation the next period is not a priori clear. At time t, a young
individual has to form expectations, where b it+1 denotes the expectation of someone
in period t about tax-level in state i (i = L;H) at timet+ 1. The model is closed
with rational expectations: agentsconjecture about the probability distribution
of taxes is correct.
Higher aggregate savings lead to lower benets the next period, as the gov-
ernment does not take into account whether low income of the old resulted from
low returns on savings or low savings. Individual savings have a neglectable e¤ect
on aggregate savings, and absent coordination agents will therefore not take into
account the e¤ect of current savings on future benets.
Older generations leave no bequests and have no decision to make. They
consume their entire accrued savings and their benets, indicated by bt  (1+n) t.
2.2. First-best: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
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In line with, among others, Ball and Mankiw [2001], ex ante e¢ ciency is used as
the welfare concept. Ex ante e¢ ciency evaluates utility of agents prior to birth,
when agents do not know in what state they are born. A policy may a¤ect utility
positively in one state of nature but negatively in another one. A policy is ex ante
e¢ cient if it maximizes the expected utility of an unborn individuals.
The solution technique is taken from Van Hemert [2005]. Let Hk denote the
set of all possible k-histories in k subsequent periods. As there are two possible
states of the world in each period, there are 2k elements in Hk. Consider maxim-
izing utility of a generation, conditioning on the last k periods only. Denoting two









P [ht = h; ht+1 = h
+]
[u(w   (h)  s(h)) + u((1 + n)(h+) + s(h)R(h+))]
R(h); s(h); (h) denote the interest rate, savings and taxes that occur in the par-
ticular k-history h; taxation and savings are contingent on the history the economy
(the previous states), including the current state.
As an example, consider k = 2 histories. There are four possibilities for both
h and h+, namely (L;L), (L;H), (H;L), (H;H), where the last entry denotes
the last time period. Note that ht denotes the k-history at time t, whereas ht+1
denotes the k-history at time t+1. P [ht = h; ht+1 = h+] denotes the probability
that ht = h and ht+1 = h+. This probability may equal zero, for example when
ht = (L;L) and ht+1 = (H;L); the rst history indicates that state L occurred at
time t and the latter indicates that H occurred at that time.
The maximization procedure takes ever more periods into account until con-
vergence. The number of k-histories after which convergence emerges, indicates
over how many generations risk is e¤ectively spread.
2.3. Second-best: political redistribution
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The government has the ability to tax the young generation and transfer the col-
lected contributions to the old. Government runs a balanced budget with total
contributions equaling total benets. The incumbent party maximizes the follow-
ing function:
W ( tjst 1; st) = (1 + n)E[V (cyt ; cot )] + u(cot 1)
s.t. (1 + n) t = bt
The benets per retiree at time t are again indicated by bt. This equation res-
ults from probabilistic voting, see Persson and Tabellini [2000]. With probabilistic
voting two competing vote-seeking political parties state their preferred tax-rate
 before elections and commit to this policy. Voters take the stated tax-rate into
account while also considering a second and xed characteristic of the political
parties. This characteristic cannot be changed by the party and it may be inter-
preted as party ideology or charisma of the political leader. The more the xed
component matters, the fewer voters can be swayed by a change of policy.
A value of  larger than 1 indicates that young voters are relatively less
inclined to vote ideologically. They are more responsive to policy changes than
older voters and more important to politicians because of it. As the parties are
symmetric, they face the same maximization problem. Therefore their chosen
policies converge, the outcome of which is given by the equation, see again Persson
and Tabellini.
Following Meijdam and Verbon [1996], government and agents take each
others action as given. In each period the young maximize expected life-time
utility taking taxes as given, and the government maximizes the probability of
being elected taking savings as given.
The outcome of the two separate maximization-problems of individuals and
government is equivalent to maximizing W (:) simultaneously with respect to both





subject to (1 + n) t = bt and subject to w = c
y
t +  t + st
Government can do no better as their objective function is maximized, but given
the maximizing value of taxation, maximizing W (:) coincides with maximizing
life-time utility of the younger cohort. The reason is that utility of the young
cohort enters additively. Complicating point in solving this equation is that the
optimal values of savings and taxation depend on savings a period earlier and on
the current (rational) expectations of taxes a period later, which in turn coincides
with actual taxes. The appendix shows existence of a unique equilibrium.
An alternative for the probability voting model is the median voter model.
This set-up has been studied by Browning [1975], Breyer and Stolte [2001], Boldrin
and Rustichini [2000], Conesa and Krueger [1999], Cooley and Soares [1996, 1999],
Rangel and Zeckhauser [1999], and Sjoblom [1985]. Which approach is more suit-
able depends on the particular question posted. In the case of population growth
and a young decisive voter, the median voter model shows the importance of co-
ordination for the occurrence of positive transfers. When workers do not trust
future generations to replicate their own positive transfer to retirees, an (ine¢ -
cient) tax of zero arises. The median voter model thereby makes immediate that
young only contribute (voluntarily) to PAYG when they anticipate that future
generations do likewise.
However, a disadvantage is that it predicts a sharp, discontinuous shift in
political power when population growth changes sign; this is a consequence of the
lack of political power of even a large minority. When retirees form a majority
a taxation of 100% is predicted. When young voters form a majority, there is a
wide range of rationalizable results, including zero transfers. Probabilistic voting
instead allows a more reasonable and precise analysis of the e¤ect of population
growth on e¢ ciency properties of pension politics.
3. First-best versus second-best
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This section determines, discusses and compares rst- and second-best allocations.
First-best allocations refer to the allocations that maximize utility of a steady-state
generation. These are the ex ante e¢ cient outcomes which are compared by the
outcomes of a political process driven by redistribution. The latter are referred to
as the second-best allocations. Before turning to the general case, the case were
savings are xed are considered. This o¤ers insight in the model and allows for a
simple analytical solution.
3.1. Fixed savings
In order to exclusively focus on the mechanism of risk sharing, rst the case of
xed savings is considered. The problem is further simplied by allowing only
non-negative transfers and transfers in state L.
The ex ante e¢ cient transfer when capital return is low, follows from max-




1  f(w   s  )
1  + (srL + (1 + n))1 g
The rst order condition equals:
(w   s  )  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n)) 
Solving this equation gives the solution:
2The expression is derived as follows. Ex ante utility is given by:
max 
2[u(w   s  ) + u(srL + (1 + n))]+
(1  )[u(w   s  ) + u(srH)]+
(1  )[u(w   s) + u(srL + (1 + n))]+
(1  )2[u(w   s) + u(srH)]
This simplies to:
max u(w   s  ) + u(srL + (1 + n)), as all expressions without  can be omitted.
9







The rst-best tax increases when wages increase or when savings or capital return
in the low state decrease. Higher income for young and a lower income for retirees
increase the ability and the need respectively to insure retirees against a shortfall
in accrued savings. The e¤ect of population growth is ambiguous; if there are
relatively many young workers, this increases the rate of return of PAYG. The
other way round, the same income can be insured to the old by a lower contribution
of the young, which can consume the remaining. This income e¤ect and insurance
e¤ect work in opposite directions and the net e¤ect on the rst-best taxation
depends on the particular values of the parameters involved.




1  f(1 + n)(w   s  )
1  + (srL + (1 + n))1 g
The rst order condition is:
(1 + n)(w   s  )  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n)) 
Solving this equation gives the following solution:







This expression gives the transfer decided on by the government. It increases
when wages increase or when savings decrease, as poorer voters are easier swayed
by a transfer. The reason is that support depends linearly on utility and utility in-
creases faster for lower values of consumption. The net e¤ect of population growth
is unambiguously negative. An increase in n leads to more political clout for the
young. This e¤ect dominates the lower rate of return of a PAYG-arrangement.
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The expressions for the rst-best and second-best transfers generally di¤er
but coincide in a special yet meaningful case. When there is an equal number
of older and younger voters and they are equally inuence able by the tax policy




This is discussed in more detail below. Generally the transfers do not coincide as
the expressions indicate and the following picture illustrates.
Table 1: parameter values in base-line scenario
wage w 1
Capital return in state L rL 0.5
Capital return in state H rH 2
probability of state L  0.5
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  4
relative ideological bias of the young  1
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1st best tax 2nd  best tax
Graph 1
Graph 1 gives transfers as a function of population growth for the values given
in the table. These values are not calibrated and are for illustrative purposes only.
The expected return of the nancial asset equals 1.25, so for values n > 0:25 the
rate of return of a PAYG-arrangement is higher than that of the capital market.
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In expected terms the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient from that point on. As
savings are xed this does not a¤ect savings.
Population growth, n, is a main determinant of di¤erences in rst-best and
second-best taxation, but is not the only one. The di¤erent degree to which young
and older voters are loyal to a party, captured by , inuences the discrepancy
between rst-best and second-best as well. A value  exceeding one indicates that
the old are relatively more ideological, which may result from habit-formation or
party loyalty. A value  lower than one results when the old are more footloose and
thereby exert de facto extra political power. This would occur if older voters care
relatively more about pensions than the working generation, for whom pensions
is an issue that will become relevant years from now. A special case results if
 = 1
1+n
. Then the cohort-size e¤ect and the ideological factor cancel out and the
transfer decided by government is ex ante e¢ cient.
Thus far the tax scheme involved only non-negative transfers and only trans-
fers in the L state with low capital returns. This allowed focusing on the most
important insurance-aspect of risk sharing; workers providing support to the eld-
erly when capital markets tumble. This restrictive assumption means that only
labor is taxed, not capital or income. While labor is indeed most heavily taxed
in most Western countries, this assumption is restrictive nonetheless. If taxation
can be both positive and negative in both states of the world, transfers in state L
would be the same. First-best and second-best transfers in state H would change
and they can be derived analogously with rH replacing rL in the expressions given
above. This case is not analyzed further; incorporation of taxation in state H in-
uences the size of the welfare e¤ects, but does not change qualitative conclusions.
It is however important to note that what is called here rst-best is second-best
from a more general perspective that considers less restrictive forms of taxation.
3.2. Endogenous savings
The assumption of xed savings provides insight in the model and allows for
analytical solutions. These xed savings can be understood as mandatory and
xed contributions to a Dened Contribution scheme that cannot be avoided and
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can also not be increased easily. Nonetheless, xed savings is a stark assumption.
One particular e¤ect is that transfers solely depend on the current state (L or
H) instead of the entire history. With endogenous savings this is no longer case,
opening up the possibility that discrepancies between taxes spill over to the next
period. In this circumstance the assumption that government takes savings as
given, becomes relevant. This is further discussed below.
3.2.1. First-best: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
The outcome when savings are endogenous is considered in graphs two and three.
This case is solved numerically for the same parameter values as before. Graph 2
shows the ex ante e¢ cient transfers for di¤erent histories as a function of popu-
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Graph 2
The results show that optimal transfers are contingent on the state of the
economy, as they are by construction. Taxation does not necessarily increase in
population growth, possibly counter intuitively. On the one hand, a high implicit
rate of return induces higher contributions, on the other hand, the "insurance"
for the elderly can be accomplished by lower contributions, exactly because of
the higher rate of return. This in turn leaves more scope in the rst period for
consumption or for savings.
The tax rate increases when more stock market crashes (state L) preceded.
Taxation spills over to future periods. This is exactly the principle of risk sharing
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which spreads losses over all future generations, see Ball and Mankiw. The spill-
over takes place via savings. In the presence of a bear market, young contribute to
the old, crowding out their own savings. As the young have lower accrued savings
the next period, the government in the next period transfers more from the then

















3.2.2. Second-best: political redistribution
The second-best allocation results from the incumbent party maximizing the num-
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Graph 5
Taxation decreases in population growth. This is the net result of two op-
posing e¤ects population growth has on contributions. Lower population growth
decreases the rate of return of PAYG, thereby making it less attractive to re-
distribute from the working generation to the older generation. However, lower
population growth also increases the political clout of the elderly, which has an
upward e¤ect on taxation. With severe aging (n = 0:5), the maximum contribu-
tions equal 49% whereas e¢ cient taxation equals 40% in that case. This increase
in taxes does not imply increased benets, which equal contributions multiplied
by population growth. This reproduces the central result of Breyer and Stolte
[2001], who argue that the burden of aging is shared by old and young with
lower benets and higher contributions.
Again taxation increases in the number of previous periods that L occurred.
In state L the asset market crashes; this hurts the retirees whereas the working
generation is not hit directly. As poorer voters are easier swayed, this results
in redistribution from young to old in state L. Workers save less as a result.
When state L occurs a second time in a row, workers have saved less and face
low returns. This makes them even worse o¤ than the generation that was rst
hit by low returns. This in turn induces an even higher transfer from the young
generation that is working then. Together this leads to higher taxation every
time an extra period in state L occurs. This resembles the contingent optimal
taxation that likewise increases in the number of preceding market lows. While
the direction of rst-best and second-best transfers is the same, the precise height
di¤ers. This is illustrated in graph 6 which gives the di¤erence between transfers
15
for di¤erent contingencies as a function of population growth. As can be seen
this is a decreasing function. In the presence of aging politics overshoots, while
transfers are too lowin the presence of population growth.
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Graph 6
3.2.3. Welfare comparison
The di¤erence between politically determined transfers and ex ante e¢ cient trans-
fers a¤ects welfare. Ultimately this e¤ect on welfare is what matters, not the e¤ect
on the tax rate per se. Graph 7 depicts the certainty equivalent of the rst and
second-best taxes as a function of population growth. The certainty equivalent
follows from a comparison between the ex ante utility in the presence of a transfer
and its complete absence. In the latter case, which can be thought of as "autarky",
the consumption during retirement age is solely determined by accrued savings.
Each young generation decides its own savings which in the baseline case equals
59%. The certainty equivalent is dened as the wage that makes someone in such
an autarkic state (with  = 0) equally well o¤ as someone that has the insurance


















The graph shows that utility increases in population growth, which follows
directly from the observation that population growth is the rate of return of a
PAYG-scheme. As can also be seen, the rst-best allocation is superior except for
the case that population size is stable. In other demographic scenarios welfare dif-
ferences are present, equaling about two percentage points of entire life-time wage
income. As the values are not calibrated, not too much should be inferred from
the exact numbers. They illustrate that intergenerational risk sharing provided
by politics comes with the cost of redistribution.
Ex ante e¢ ciency is the welfare criterion. This can be distinguished from
the concept of a social planner maximizing a Social Welfare Function. Ex ante
utility assesses utility of someone prior to birth and when the PAYG-system is
in place. Expected life-time utility of a steady stategeneration is subsequently
maximized. A steady state generation does not know in which state of the world it
is born, except that a PAYG-system is already in place. A Social Welfare Function
on the other hand typically maximizes utility of current and future generations
explicitly, starting with the retired generation that receives a windfall gain when
the PAYG-system originates. Ex ante utility does not consider the welfare gain for
the rst retired generation. Though this is a real gain for the rst generation, this
welfare criterion combines risk sharing and redistribution to the rst generation
(for which good reasons may or may not exist). This paper wants to focus solely
on the political e¤ects on risk sharing. The distortionary e¤ect of politics results
primarily from the increased political inuence of large cohorts.
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This can be contrasted with DAmato and Galasso who use a Social Welfare
Function as the welfare criterion. Under a reparameterization this SWF coincides
with the political outcome of this paper.3 DAmato and Galasso then e¤ectively
analyze the e¤ect of a further ine¢ ciency that springs from the Stackelberg beha-
vior of their government (see further below).
3.2.4. The source of ine¢ ciency
As discussed, the rst-best and second-best transfers only coincide in a special
but meaningful case. The equivalence follows analytically when savings are xed
and was illustrated above when savings are endogenous. In the latter case the
equivalence can also be shown mathematically4. In other cases, the di¤erent ef-
3With previous savings s given and implementing a transfer scheme in state L, the SWF
equals: u(srL + (1 + n)L) + (1 + n)fu(w   sL   L)
+u(sLrL + LL(1 + n)) + (1  )u(sLrH))g+
(1 + n)22fu(w   sLL   LL)
+u(sLLrL + LLL(1 + n)) + (1  )u(sLLrH))g
Here  is the discount rate the social planner uses for future generations. This function is
maximized w.r.t. savings (sL; sLL; ::) and taxes (L; LL; ::). Note that only a sequence of
states L is considered. Taxes in state H equal zero, so they need not be considered explicitly.
After at least one state H a new sequence arises that may lead to di¤erent taxation but that is
not considered here. With  =  the function exactly equals a sequence of incumbent parties
maximizing political support. The di¤erence is that that function is maximized each period
w.r.t. current savings and taxes. However if the optimizing values of the social planner would
be proposed, no individual or political party could improve upon that solution. Hence it is also
the outcome of the political process.
4Suppose histories with k periods are considered. Ex ante e¢ cient transfers are then con-
tingent on k   1 periods. Denote by h one particular contingency of k   1 periods. Using that
n = 0 rst-best allocations follow from:
maxh p(h)u(w   sh   h)+
(1  )p(h)u(w   sh   h)+
p(h)u(shrL + h)+
(1  )p(h)u(shrL + h)
Here p(h) denotes the probability of h occurring, and sh and h denote savings and transfers
in that contingency. Contingencies with the rst k   1 periods equal to h and ending in either
state H or L contribute to utility in the rst period, whereas contingencies with the last k   1
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fect of population growth is the source of the discrepancy between rst-best and
second-best. The reason is that they have a tendency to buyvotes by using the
transfer mechanism to redistribute to larger and more pragmatic cohorts. In so,
politicians overweigh large cohorts.
In the political process current political parties take future taxes as given
and do not take into account that current taxes (may) inuence future taxation.
The connection results from the e¤ect of taxation on private savings. If these
are crowded out by public transfers, workers will have lower savings during their
retirement. This in turn induces the next government to redistribute to these
retirees. Higher taxes lead to higher future benets for current workers. DAmato
and Galasso propose that governments take that into account. Politicians exploit
their rst-mover advantage by increasing taxes at the expense of private savings,
resulting in higher taxes in the future. Taking this e¤ect into account adds another
source of ine¢ ciency. Which approach is more reasonable, is an empirical question.
Nash behavior is restrictive as political parties do not consider future reactions
whatsoever. The Stackelberg-approach is also not unproblematic, as the opposite
extreme is assumed: governments know and take fully into account the behavior
of future governments. As one period in a two-period OLG model represents 30
years, this is likewise a stark assumption. In reality there will typically be a mixed
case. The assumption of Nash behavior allows focusing exlusively on the political
e¤ect of cohort size on intergenerational risk sharing.
4. Conclusion
Intergenerational risk sharing cannot be implemented by markets. Only the gov-
periods equal to h and starting in either state H or L contribute to utility in the second period.
Together this gives the four parts of the expression. Simplifying that expression gives
maxh u(w   sh   h) + u(shrL + h)
This coincides with the second-best transfers, if rst-best and second-best savings are equal.
This is in turn assured because for given taxes, the rst-best savings decision and the second-best
savings decision coincide. As this holds for all contingencies, rst-best and second-best transfers
coincide if n = 0.
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ernment or a pension fund with mandatory participation can do so. However,
political institutions have an incentive to redistribute. In the realm of intergener-
ational risk sharing there is thus no insurance without redistribution.
As a result ex ante e¢ ciency is generally out of reach of politics as well. Such
are the unavoidable costs of political institutions. This is the rst result of the
paper: politics generally does not lead to ex ante e¢ ciency. From an ex ante per-
spective, politics is still better than no transfers at all and this is the second result
of the paper. The third result concerns the e¤ect of aging on intergenerational
risk sharing. As Bovenberg [2008] states, "the danger facing aging societies is that
older voters block the needed reforms. In that case, a conict arises between the
political power of older generations (who depend on public transfers and are risk
averse) and the economic power of the younger, working generations (who control
the major resource that fuel the modern knowledge-intensive economy namely,
human capital and entrepreneurship). In other words, politics collides with eco-
nomics." In this paper a majority of retirees cannot outright block a reform, as a
median voter model would have it. However, some concern is indeed warranted,
as aging increases the discrepancy between rst- and second-best outcomes.
Social Security in many countries developed in the 1930s-1950s; for example
the USA implemented PAYG-nanced Social Security in 1937 when many retirees
had su¤ered the Depression. The resulting decrease in retirements was an im-
portant motive for Social Security. Although the paper does not predict a specic
moment Social Security is implemented, timing and motivation coincide with an
implication of the model that intergenerational transfers are used when retirees
have witnessed a severe nancial set-back.
The conclusions hold for a wide range of population growth rates and are
robust to changes in risk aversion (not shown here) and endogeneity of savings.
The current set-up is nonetheless limited in several ways. It does not address in-
centive and crowding out e¤ects, thereby overestimating the gains of risk sharing.
However, by modeling only two generations the potential gain from risk sharing
between more generations is underestimated. The model also does not take eco-
nomic growth into account, further underestimating the return on PAYG. And by
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ignoring other risk-factors as longevity and productivity the importance of risk
sharing is underestimated. Though a welfare gain of 31% in the base-line case
is remarkably in line with ndings of Van Hemert (33%) and Gollier (25%), it
cannot be assessed a priori what the net result of these di¤erent e¤ects is. These
limitations are recognized and some of them could be further incorporated into
the model.
These limitations are however not essential for the main argument. If politics
hinders risk-sharing in the relatively simple set-up here, then sharing risks in a
more complex environment can certainly not be taken for granted. The aim of
this paper is not to determine the optimal tax per se, but to provide an analyt-
ical framework to assess whether whatever is optimal arises endogenously in the
political process. The bad news is that the democratic process generally does not
lead to e¢ ciency. The good news is that politics does a lot better than a situation
without any intergenerational transfers.
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Appendix: Existence of a unique solution
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The objective is to maximize at each time t the following function. Simplication
of the problem by posing n = 0 does not alter the problem essentially:
max
;s
Wt(st 1;bLt ) = 1(1  ) [rtst 1 +  ]1  + 1(1  )f[w      s]1  +
[srL + bLt ]1  + (1  )[srH ]1 g
At each time t st 1 and bLt are given. So there exists a unique solution at
each time t by the theorem of Weierstrass and strict concavity of the objective
function. However, it needs to be shown that solutions converge in the following
sense: there exists an integer l such that taxes and savings conditional on the last
l periods equal taxes and savings conditional on the last l + m > l histories for
any m > 0. So, savings and taxes at time t only depend on (the state of the
economy in) the last l periods. This in turn e¤ectively allows cutting o¤history
at one point. For l=3, m=1, this would for example mean HHLL  LHLL. The
superscript here indicates the state in the current period (here L) the and previous
periods.
Now taxes are set zero in state H (corresponding to a booming capital market);
this makes that size of the savings of retirees do not matter for savings of the
young. The old just consume their savings, while the young optimize given their
expectation of future taxation, irrespective of the old. So, once state H is reached,
only the current state (H) matters and convergence follows a fortiori.
The problem now reduces to showing that there is a period for which  i::jL::LL 
 p::qL::LL. That is, no matter with what previous savings and expectations state L
is reached, after having been in the same state L a nite number of times taxation
and savings converge. Note that Wt(st 1;bLt ) maps previous savings (st 1) and
expected taxes in the future state L (bLt ) into current savings and taxes st and
 t. (Expected taxes in the future state H are zero.) Call this mapping inform-
ally fL(st 1;bLt ) = (st;  t). Now, the only candidate for convergence is a xed
23
point (s;  ) of this mapping, dened by fL(s;  ) = (s;  ). By the xed point
theorem, at least one xed point exists.
Now, savings converge if and only if taxes converge, that is:
1) fL(es;  ) = (s0 ;  ) =) es = s0 = s and 2) fL(s;e) = (s;  0) =) e =  0 =  
Ad 1) If  t = bLt =  , then for any s 1 the young face the same maximization
problem; previous savings do not enter their maximization problem. Hence st =
s. This in turn implies s 1 = s. If not, then the old are strictly worse or
strictly better o¤ than if s 1 = s, which would induce higher or lower taxation
by the politician, due to strict concaveness of the objective function, contradicting
 t = 
.
Ad 2) If previous savings are s, then taxes expected by the young are  , and
consequently fL(s;  ) = (s;  ) by denition.
Convergence of either savings or taxes is enough for convergence of the two-
dimensional function. This reduces a two-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional
problem. The function fL is hard to derive analytically, but can readily be
sketched graphically. As long as properties concerning slope, curvature and the
behavior at corner points are given, the equation can be solved by use of phase
diagrams. This involves the drawing of a 45-degree line, the intersection of which
with the function gives the xed point. If the solution exists, as indeed it does
here, then in the one-dimensional case stability conditions are that the derivative
is strictly less than 1 in absolute value. As can be seen from the graphs, shown in
the appendix, this is the case.
An important assumption in the above is the zero taxation in state H. This
considerably reduces the complexity of the problem. This is done for practical
considerations and considering it does not change the intuition of the result. An
interpretation of such a restriction is that it is not politically feasible to impose
positive taxation during a booming capital market.
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